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Abstract 
 
Existing models of two-sided markets explain why platforms charge different prices between buyers 
and sellers. Generally, the platform will subsidize participation on a side of the market the higher is 
that side’s positive cross-side externality to users on the other side of the market. However, in 
matching markets there also exists a negative own-side congestion externality that the platform 
internalizes by taxing users for its presence. Assuming a monopoly platform pricing model, the first 
contribution of this paper is to show that these positive cross-side and negative own-side 
externalities can be summarized by the matching elasticity derived from a general matching 
function that captures the efficiency of the platform’s matching technology. The platform charges a 
lower price to a side of the market the higher is that side’s matching elasticity. The second 
contribution of this paper is to show that the platform’s pricing strategy only partially internalizes 
the efficiency of its matching technology, compared to the social optimum. In particular, we discuss 
the possibility that a monopoly matchmaker sets too high a price on the low-price side of the market 
and too low a price on the high-price side of the market, resulting in insufficient inequality in prices 
between sides of the platform. 
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1. Introduction 
Increasing volumes of transactions in matching markets happen through private 
platforms. Characteristic to these matchmaking platforms is the existence of network 
externalities. For example, the probability for an individual worker to find a job through an 
online job board decreases when there are more job-seekers and fewer vacancies. Similarly, 
a realtor may find it difficult to sell one’s home when rivalry among sellers is fierce. In 
such settings where the matching technology is characterized by important own-side and 
cross-side externalities, what prices should private platforms charge on both sides of the 
market and what implications do these externalities entail for welfare? 
Platforms charge different prices between sides of the market (see, among others, 
Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006), Armstrong (2006), Weyl 
(2010)). Generally, the platform’s price to one side of the market will be lower the larger is 
that side’s positive cross-side externality to users on the other side of the market. For 
example, when one side of the market only differs in that there are more users, the platform 
will charge this side a lower price because it is easier for users on the other side to trade. 
However, matching markets are also characterized by a negative own-side congestion 
externality. For example, the realization of a worker-firm match implies that this vacancy is 
no longer available to other job-seekers and that this worker is no longer employable at 
other firms. 
To formally analyze the different incentives that a matchmaking platform has in its 
pricing behavior, this paper first introduces a general matching function – a concept well-
known from the labor economics literature (see, for example, Petrongolo and Pissarides 
(2001) for a review) – that captures the platform’s matching technology. The matching 
technology is said to be more efficient for a side of the market when the negative own-side 
externality – which we express in absolute value throughout the paper – is small and the 
positive cross-side externality is large. We show that the platform’s matching efficiency for 
a side of the market can be meaningfully summarized by that side’s matching elasticity, 
defined as the percentage increase in total matches for a percentage increase in own-side 
participation. That is, a smaller negative own-side and larger positive cross-side externality 
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– or a more efficient matching technology – implies a higher matching elasticity for that 
side of the platform.  
The first contribution of this paper is to show that the optimal price charged by a 
monopoly matchmaker to a side of the market is lower when that side’s matching elasticity 
is higher. The intuition for this result is simple. A higher matching elasticity results from a 
smaller negative own-side and a larger positive cross-side externality. Because this gives 
the monopoly matchmaker less of an incentive to tax the negative own-side effect and more 
of an incentive to subsidize the positive cross-side externality, its price will be lower. 
Consistently, we show that in a symmetric setting in which two sides differ only in their 
matching elasticities, the monopoly matchmaker charges a lower price to the side that has 
the highest matching elasticity. The results are illustrated for a monopoly matchmaker that 
uses a listing technology: one side of the market posts advertisements and the other side 
searches through these ads. We show that the platform sets prices such that the searching 
side of the market has the highest matching elasticity and hence is charged the lowest fee.  
The second contribution of this paper is to show that a monopoly matchmaker only 
partially internalizes the efficiency of its matching technology compared to the incentives 
of a social planner. We show that a higher matching elasticity leads to a larger difference 
between the private platform’s and socially optimal price. The intuition for this is the 
following. A higher matching elasticity decreases the profit maximizing price which 
increases participation by marginal users. However, these marginal users value the 
platform’s service less than the average user. This heterogeneity in user types gives the 
private platform an incentive to discourage participation by charging a higher price 
compared to a social maximizer that internalizes the matching externalities through their 
average and not marginal user valuations. In addition to this, we derive a relationship 
between the matching technology and price distortions between sides of the platform. In 
particular, we show that a monopoly matchmaker could set too low a price on the high-
price side of the market and too high a price on the low-price side of the market, resulting 
in inequality in prices between sides of the platform that is too low from a social point of 
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view. We illustrate this case assuming realistic parameter values for lognormally distributed 
heterogeneity in user types and a constant returns to scale matching function. 
In the literature, various other contributions have recently been made on the topic of 
optimal pricing by matching platforms. Closest related is Chen and Huang (2012) who 
consider a specific matching technology where sellers post the price for their goods to 
attract buyers and buyers choose sellers. As is the case here, the platform’s optimal price 
depends on the platform’s matching technology. Although their framework is in many ways 
richer than ours (e.g. we do not analyze the possibility that platform fees are passed through 
by sellers in the price of a good), the assumed matching process is specific and therefore 
does not allow for the derivation of the relationship between the platform’s optimal prices 
and its matching technology as generally. For example, the result of Chen and Huang 
(2012) that the seller-side of the market is never subsidized by a private platform is 
confirmed by the present study. We show that for a listing platform the matching elasticity 
of the seller-side is indeed lower than that of the buyer-side and hence the seller-side is 
charged the highest fee. Furthermore, we show that this price asymmetry is likely to be 
insufficient compared to the social optimum. 
Also closely related is the study of Niedermayer and Shneyerov (forthcoming) who 
analyze optimal platform pricing in a dynamic random matching model with buyer-seller 
bargaining. These authors show that under a symmetric matching technology, asymmetric 
bargaining weights results in asymmetric optimal platform fees and suggest that the 
presence of a monopoly intermediary in a search market can be welfare enhancing. The 
present paper has exogenous valuations for buyers and sellers and ignores certain 
bargaining issues to focus on the market distortions that potentially emerge from an 
asymmetric matching technology.  
Also, Damiano and Li (2007, 2008) explore the sorting role of optimal pricing by a 
private monopolist and by duopolists under user “quality” differentiation. In contrast, we 
abstract from complementarities between user types such that sorting of users plays no role 
and we do not allow the platform to price discriminate within user groups. Our focus is on 
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the network externalities linked to the matching technology, a feature not explicitly 
analyzed in Damiano and Li (2007, 2008). 
Finally, Ellison and Fudenberg (2003) propose a general framework to analyze how the 
joint presence of cross- and own-side network externalities affects the market participation 
decision of two types of user groups. They do not explicitly analyze, however, the optimal 
pricing behavior of platforms. Belleflamme and Toulemonde (2009), among others, do 
analyze the impact of both network effects on optimal platform behavior, but not in a 
setting of one-to-one matching as in the present paper. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the simplest 
possible framework of a monopoly matchmaker where network externalities are captured 
by a matching function that generally characterizes the platform’s matching technology. 
Section 3 shows how the platform’s optimal prices depend on the platform’s matching 
technology, and Section 4 examines implications for welfare. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Framework 
2.1. User participation 
Consider a platform that connects two types of user groups 𝐼 = 𝐴,𝐵. When users on 
side 𝐼 participate they have a probability 0 ≤ 𝑚𝐼 ≤ 1 of being matched,  assumed to be the 
same for all users on the same side but allowed to differ across sides – these matching 
probabilities are further characterized in the next subsection. Users on side I are 
heterogeneous in two dimensions: 𝑉𝐼 ∈ ℝ denotes the valuation of an I-side user when 
matched and 𝑍𝐼 ∈ ℝ when unmatched. For example, the match valuation 𝑉𝐼 could be the 
wage a job-seeker expects to get or the price a home-seller expects to receive, net of any 
costs for searching the platform. The outside option 𝑍𝐼 could be the job-seeker’s 
unemployment benefit or the mortgage cost for the home-owner (in which case 𝑍𝐼 will be 
negative).  
The platform charges a flat fee for the matching service, which is allowed to differ 
across the two sides of the market, but is the same to all participants within sides. The price 
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is modeled as a per-match fee 𝑝𝐼 which is paid by participants conditional on being 
matched. Note that the price can equivalently be modeled as a participation fee 𝑃𝐼 which is 
paid by users when they enter the platform by simply substituting for 𝑝𝐼 = 𝑃𝐼/𝑚𝐼 in all 
expressions below. We prefer, however, to display the analysis in terms of per-match fees 
because it simplifies notation. Further note that the equivalence between the two fee types 
might not necessarily hold in practice. For example, it could be costly to monitor matching 
outcomes such that the platform would prefer charging participation over per-match fees. 
Appendix A discusses the assumptions underlying the equivalence in greater detail and 
elaborates on cases for which it no longer holds. 
In the setting described, expected utility for a user on side I of the platform equals: 
𝑈𝐼 = (𝑉𝐼 − 𝑝𝐼)𝑚𝐼 + 𝑍𝐼(1 −𝑚𝐼)                                                (1)                                  
Expected utility net of the outside option, defined as  𝑢𝐼 ≡ 𝑈𝐼 − 𝑍𝐼, can then be written as: 
𝑢𝐼 = (𝑣𝐼 − 𝑝𝐼)𝑚𝐼                                                              (2)                                                          
in which 𝑣𝐼 ≡ 𝑉𝐼 − 𝑍𝐼 is defined as the net match valuation. From equation (2) it follows 
that an I-side user will participate if his net match valuation is positive, i.e. when 𝑢𝐼 ≥ 0.1 
Finally, assume that the net match valuation 𝑣𝐼 is distributed by a twice continuously 
differentiable distribution function 𝐹𝐼(. ) and density function 𝑓𝐼(. ) that are public 
information. For a mass of potential participants 𝑛𝐼, the number of participating users on 
side I of the platform is given by:2 
𝑁𝐼 = 𝑛𝐼�1 − 𝐹𝐼(𝑝𝐼)�                                                          (3)                                                  
1 Note that the participation decision only depends on a single source of user heterogeneity, i.e. a user’s net match valuation 𝑣𝐼. This 
simplification follows from the assumptions that users are risk neutral and that they differ in their outside options rather than in their 
fixed benefits of using the platform as is assumed in, among others, Armstrong (2006), Rochet and Tirole (2006) and Weyl (2010). 
2 Note that we deviate from the classic platform pricing models by not normalizing the mass of potential users to unity on both sides of 
the market. The reason for this is that most specifications of the matching function are only sensible when thinking about a "number" 
rather than a "fraction" of participating users. 
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2.2 The matching function and matching elasticities 
If 𝑁𝐴 users participate on side A and 𝑁𝐵 users participate on side B of the platform, we 
assume that the total number of matches is given by the well-known matching function 
𝑀 = 𝑀(𝑁𝐴,𝑁𝐵). The advantage of introducing this matching function is that it allows us 
to account for the efficiency of the matching technology without having to make explicit 
the imperfections in the matching process. We also assume that the platform is a random 
matchmaker such that all participants on the same side have the same probability of being 
matched: 
𝑚𝐼 = 𝑀/𝑁𝐼                                                                        (4)                                                      
As is standard in the matching literature, the matching function 𝑀(𝑁𝐴,𝑁𝐵) is assumed 
to be (i) twice continuously differentiable; (ii) weakly increasing; (iii) weakly concave; and 
to have that (iv) 𝑀(𝑁𝐴, 0) = 𝑀(0,𝑁𝐵) = 0; (v) 𝑀 ≤ 𝑚𝑖𝑛[𝑁𝐴,𝑁𝐵]. Under these weak 
regularity conditions, it is easy to show that the match probability 𝑚𝐼 = 𝑀(𝑁𝐼 ,𝑁𝐽)/𝑁𝐼 
(with J the other side than I) is weakly decreasing in own-side participation 𝑁𝐼 which 
captures a negative own-side externality, and weakly increasing in cross-side participation 
𝑁𝐽 which captures a positive cross-side externality.  
A useful way to summarize the negative own-side and positive cross-side externalities 
in the matching technology is through the matching elasticity for side 𝐼: 
𝜙𝐼 ≡
𝜕𝑀
𝜕𝑁𝐼
𝑁𝐼
𝑀
                                                                           (5) 
with 0 ≤ 𝜙𝐼 ≤ 1. The matching elasticity for side I is defined as the percentage increase in 
the total number of matches for a percentage increase in own-side participation. 
Importantly, there is a one-to-one relationship between the negative own-side and positive 
cross-side externalities and the matching elasticity. To see this, note that the negative own-
side externality per-match is given by: 
�𝑁𝐼
𝜕𝑚𝐼
𝜕𝑁𝐼
1
𝑚𝐼
� = 1 − 𝜙𝐼                                                          (6) 
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which is the absolute value of the sum across 𝑁𝐼 participants (which gives the term 𝑁𝐼) of 
the decrease in their match probability when another I-side user enters the platform (which 
gives the term 𝜕𝑚𝐼/𝜕𝑁𝐼) rescaled on a per-match base (which gives the term 1/𝑚𝐼). 
Similarly, the positive cross-side externality per-match is the sum across 𝑁𝐽 participants of 
the increase in their match probability when another I-side user enters the platform:  
𝑁𝐽
𝜕𝑚𝐽
𝜕𝑁𝐼
1
𝑚𝐼
= 𝜙𝐼                                                                (7) 
The intuition of equations (6) and (7) is straightforward. Equation (6) shows that the 
matching elasticity is decreasing in the negative own-side externality. The reason for this is 
that an additional participant on side I decreases the matching probability for all I-side 
users. This effect is smaller if additional users are more easily matched, i.e. if the matching 
elasticity is larger. Similarly, equation (7) shows that the matching elasticity is increasing in 
the positive cross-side externality because an additional user on side I leads to an increase 
in the matching probability for J-side users that is higher the more efficient the platform is 
at matching I-side users. 
2.3 Private monopoly platform 
We assume that there is a private monopoly platform that sets per-match fees to both 
sides of the platform in a first stage. In the second stage potential users on both sides 
simultaneously decide to participate. In a third stage, matched users pay the per-match fee 
to the platform. In this setting, the monopoly matchmaker will choose per-match fees 𝑝𝐴 
and 𝑝𝐵 to maximize profits given by: 
𝜋(𝑝𝐴,𝑝𝐵) = (𝑝𝐴 + 𝑝𝐵)𝑀(𝑁𝐴,𝑁𝐵)                                             (8) 
subject to equation (3). Also note that we have assumed for simplicity that there are no 
costs for operating the platform. 
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3. Analysis 
3.1. Equilibrium prices 
Proposition 1 follows from the first-order conditions of the profit maximization 
problem, in which 𝜇𝐼 ≡ (1 − 𝐹𝐼(𝑣𝐼�))/𝑓𝐼(𝑣𝐼�) is the inverse hazard rate of demand on side 𝐼 
and 𝑣𝐼� is the net match valuation of the marginal 𝐼-side participant who is indifferent 
between participating or not such that 𝑣𝐼� ≡ 𝑝𝐼:3 
Proposition 1. At the optimal allocation, the per-match fee a private monopoly platform 
charges on each side 𝐼 = 𝐴,𝐵 (𝐽 ≠ 𝐼) is: 
𝑝𝐼 = 𝜇𝐼 + 𝑣𝐼�(1 − 𝜙𝐼) − 𝑣𝐽�𝜙𝐼                                                       (9) 
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (9) is the inverse hazard rate of 
demand, which is the classic Cournot (1838) measure of monopoly market power. The 
second term on the right-hand side shows how the platform internalizes the per-match 
negative own-side externality by taxing I-side users. This tax is larger when the matching 
elasticity is smaller, i.e. when the platform’s matching technology is less efficient because 
the negative own-side externality is stronger. The final term on the right-hand side of 
equation (9) shows how the platform subsidizes the positive cross-side externality. This 
subsidy is increasing in the matching elasticity because a more efficient matching 
technology exists when an additional I-side user increases the matching probability of any 
J-side user by more.  
In sum, we show that the platform’s matching technology – characterized by negative 
own-side and positive cross-side externalities – can be meaningfully summarized by the 
matching elasticity and indicate that the price a monopoly matchmaker charges on any side 
of the platform is decreasing in that side’s matching elasticity. 
3 It is well-known from the platform pricing literature that in the described optimization problem, induced by the presence of network 
externalities, there is equilibrium multiplicity because of user coordination failures. Appendix B discusses various approaches proposed 
by Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003) and Weyl (2010) of how the platform can uniquely establish its preferred equilibrium. 
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3.2. Asymmetric pricing between sides of the platform 
So far we have analyzed what determines the optimal price on a given side of the 
platform. An interesting question is what this implies for price asymmetries between sides 
of the platform. Using equation (9) and the fact that  𝑣𝐼� ≡ 𝑝𝐼 and 𝑣𝐽� ≡ 𝑝𝐽, we get that: 
𝑝𝐴 + 𝑝𝐵 = 𝜇𝐴
𝜙𝐴
= 𝜇𝐵
𝜙𝐵
 or that 𝜙𝐴
𝜙𝐵
= 𝜇𝐴
𝜇𝐵
                                         (10) 
where the inverse hazard rates are given by 𝜇𝐼 ≡ (1 − 𝐹𝐼(𝑝𝐼))/𝑓𝐼(𝑝𝐼) for 𝐼 = 𝐴,𝐵. For 
example, assume that 𝜙𝐴 > 𝜙𝐵 and that 𝜇𝐼 is decreasing in 𝑝𝐼 for 𝐼 = 𝐴,𝐵. If the 
platform’s technology is such that it is better at matching side-A than side-B users such that 
𝜙𝐴 > 𝜙𝐵, we must have that 𝜇𝐴 > 𝜇𝐵. And if these hazard rates are decreasing in their 
prices such that 𝑝𝐴 < 𝑝𝐵, the platform will charge a lower price to the side that has the 
highest matching elasticity.4  
Whether 𝜇𝐼 is increasing or decreasing in 𝑝𝐼 depends on the distribution of net match 
valuations.5 To summarize this, assume for simplicity that net match valuations are 
symmetrically distributed and that the matching elasticities are constant. Then from 
Proposition 1 and equation (10) it follows that: 
Corollary 1. Assume symmetrically distributed net match valuations �𝐹𝐴(. ) = 𝐹𝐵(. )� and 
a constant elasticity matching function (𝜙𝐴 and 𝜙𝐵 constant). Then, for a decreasing 
inverse hazard rate of demand, we have that: 
𝑝𝐴 < 𝑝𝐵 ⇔ 𝜙𝐴 > 𝜙𝐵                                                           (11) 
The result reverses for an increasing hazard rate. 
 
4 Also note that equation (10) is consistent with Rochet and Tirole (2003) who assume that each user on one side can interact with all the 
users on the other side. This implies a ‘matching elasticity’ of unity on each side of the market. Consequently, they show that the optimal 
price structure satisfies 𝑝𝐴 + 𝑝𝐵 = 𝜇𝐴 = 𝜇𝐵 or that price asymmetries can arise because of differences in underlying preferences between 
both sides of the platform. However, equation (10) shows that asymmetric prices can also be explained by the properties of the matching 
technology under which the platform operates even if preferences are symmetrically distributed. 
5 Fabinger and Weyl (2012) provide a formal discussion on the properties of demand and show that for the majority of distribution 
classes the hazard rate is decreasing in price. 
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3.3 An application: a listing service platform 
In Corollary 1 we have assumed that matching elasticities are constant, i.e. independent 
of the chosen allocation by the platform. However, externalities induced by a marginal 
participant on either side might vary with the amount of users already present on both sides 
of the platform. For example, the externalities induced by a marginal worker that enters a 
job search engine could be very different whether that worker is the 10th or 1000th user to 
enter the platform. To explore this, one needs to go further and model the micro-
foundations of the matching function which is what we do in this subsection. More 
specifically, we reinterpret a familiar microfoundation of the matching function – “urn-
ball” matching – as the matching technology of a listing service platform. The conclusion is 
that the intuition derived above remains valid even if the matching elasticities are no longer 
constants. Also then the side of the platform that has the higher matching elasticity is 
charged a lower price. 
Consider a market in which a monopoly platform serves as a matchmaker by offering a 
listing service. Sellers participate by posting an advertisement for their goods on the 
platform and buyers search across sellers. We refer to users on the posting-side as firms 
(side 𝐴) who post job vacancies and the searching-side as workers (side 𝐵), but one can 
similarly think of 𝐴 as sellers and 𝐵 as buyers of any good or service. Each participating 
firm lists a single vacancy and each participating worker randomly applies to a single 
vacancy. So, some firms may receive no applications while others may receive many. It is 
assumed that those firms receiving more applications randomly select one, such that some 
workers will remain unmatched. In this setting, it is the presence of coordination failures 
among workers that characterizes the platform’s matching technology and externalities. 
The matching process can be formally analyzed as follows. Denote the number of firms 
that list on the platform by 𝑁𝐴 > 1. Given a probability 1/𝑁𝐴 that a firm receives an 
application from a given worker, the probability of not receiving an application from that 
worker is (1 − 1/𝑁𝐴). Denoting the number of workers that search on the list of vacancies 
by 𝑁𝐵 > 1, the probability that a firm ends up without any worker is then given by:  
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 (1 − 1/𝑁𝐴)𝑁𝐵 ≈ exp (−𝑁𝐵/𝑁𝐴)                                                  (12) 
where the approximation holds only if 𝑁𝐴 is sufficiently large. Hence, the probability that a 
given firm will be matched to a worker is approximated by 1 − exp (−𝑁𝐵/𝑁𝐴 ).  
If there are 𝑁𝐴 firms listing on the platform, the expected number of total matches is 
then given by the following matching function: 
𝑀(𝑁𝐴,𝑁𝐵) = 𝑁𝐴(1 − exp (−𝑁𝐵/𝑁𝐴))                                                 (13) 
It follows from this matching function that the matching elasticities with respect to workers 
and firms are, respectively: 
𝜙𝐵 = 𝑁𝐵
𝑁𝐴
exp (−𝑁𝐵/𝑁𝐴)1 − exp (−𝑁𝐵/𝑁𝐴)   and  𝜙𝐴 = 1 − 𝜙𝐵                                  (14) 
which are not constants. Moreover, the matching elasticities are not symmetric between 
both sides of the platform. For example, assuming that 𝑁𝐴 = 𝑁𝐵, we get that 𝜙𝐴 = 0.42  
and 𝜙𝐵 = 0.58. The higher matching elasticity for workers than for firms captures the fact 
that the listing platform is more efficient at matching workers than firms. One intuition for 
this is that workers are “active” in this model in the sense that they apply to vacancies 
taking into account the (expected) behavior of other workers. In contrast, firms are 
“passive” in the sense that they simply post a vacancy and hope at least one worker applies. 
Further assume, for simplicity, that the mass of potential participants is symmetric, 
𝑛𝐴 = 𝑛𝐵, and sufficiently large. Also assume that the net match valuations 𝑣𝐴 and 𝑣𝐵 are 
both uniformly distributed over the unit interval such that inverse demand on each side 
𝐼 = 𝐴,𝐵 of the platform is given by 𝑝𝐼 = 1 − 𝑁𝐼/𝑛𝐼. This implies a decreasing inverse 
hazard rate of the form 𝜇𝐼 = 1 − 𝑝𝐼 for 𝐼 = 𝐴,𝐵. Solving for profit maximizing prices – 
accounting for the fact that the matching elasticities are no longer constants – gives the 
following outcomes for the worker side of the platform: 𝑝𝐵 = 0.47 and 𝜇𝐵 = 𝜙𝐵 = 0.53. 
For the firm side of the platform we get: 𝑝𝐴 = 0.53 and 𝜇𝐴 = 𝜙𝐴 = 0.47. Consequently, 
the optimal per match fee is lower on the worker side that also has a higher matching 
elasticity as Corollary 1 suggests.  
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4. Welfare analysis 
4.1 Socially optimal price setting 
An important question is how the optimal pricing behavior of a private monopoly 
matchmaker that we discussed in the previous section compares to the outcome of a social 
planner. Assume a Pigouvian platform that sets prices to maximize its total social value, 
equal to the sum of aggregate utility of participants on the two sides of the market and the 
private platform’s profits. The maximization problem for the welfare maximizer is then 
given by: max
𝑝𝜔
𝐴 ,𝑝𝜔𝐵𝜔 = �𝑣𝐴���� + 𝑣𝐵�����𝑀(𝑁𝐴,𝑁𝐵)                                              (15) 
subject to equation (3) for 𝐼 = 𝐴,𝐵 and where: 
𝑣𝐼� ≡
𝑛𝐼
𝑁𝐼
� 𝑣𝐼𝑓𝐼(𝑣𝐼)𝑑𝑣𝐼∞
𝑝𝜔
𝐼
                                                     (16) 
denotes the average net match valuation of participants on side 𝐼 = 𝐴,𝐵. Proposition 2 
shows how the social maximizer internalizes the negative own-side and positive cross-side 
externality in the matching function: 
Proposition 2. At the optimal allocation, a Pigouvian platform charges a per-match fee 𝑝𝐼 
on each side 𝐼 = 𝐴,𝐵 (𝐽 ≠ 𝐼) that equals: 
𝑝𝜔
𝐼 = 𝑣𝐼� (1 − 𝜙𝐼) − 𝑣𝐽���𝜙𝐼                                                      (17) 
From equation (17) it is clear that the Pigouvian platform also taxes the negative own-
side and subsidizes the positive cross-side externality. However, it does so proportional to 
the average net match valuation of all users participating on the platform, and not the 
marginal user’s match valuation as was the case in Proposition 1. Before turning to the 
market distortions that result from these diverging incentives, first note that the Pigouvian 
price can also be written as:  𝑝𝜔𝐼 = 𝑣𝐼� 𝜙𝐽 − 𝑣𝐽���𝜙𝐼 + 𝑣𝐼� (1 − 𝜙𝐼 − 𝜙𝐽)                                         (18) 
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Equation (18) demonstrates that when the matching technology is characterized by 
constant returns to scale, the Pigouvian platform will unambiguously subsidize one side of 
the market and will exactly recover this subsidy from the other side. To see this, note that 
for 𝜙𝐴 + 𝜙𝐵 = 1, 𝑝𝜔𝐴 = 𝑣𝐴����𝜙𝐵 − 𝑣𝐵����𝜙𝐴 and  𝑝𝜔𝐵 = 𝑣𝐵����𝜙𝐴 − 𝑣𝐴����𝜙𝐵, which are exactly 
opposites: 𝑝𝜔𝐴 = −𝑝𝜔𝐵 . Which side of the market is subsidized depends on the matching 
technology, but also on the underlying heterogeneity of net match valuations. This result is 
further illustrated in the application in subsection 4.4. 
4.2 Market Distortions 
To illustrate the diverging incentives of the private and Pigouvian platform more clearly, 
we can use equations (9) and (17) to define the market distortion on side I as: 
𝑀𝐷𝐼 ≡ 𝑝𝐼 − 𝑝𝜔
𝐼 = 𝜇𝐼 + �𝑣𝐽��� − 𝑣𝐽��𝜙𝐼 − �𝑣𝐼� − 𝑣𝐼��(1 − 𝜙𝐼)����� ���� ���� ������
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛                 (19) 
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (19) is the inverse hazard rate of demand – 
the classic Cournot distortion – that captures the market power of the private monopolist. 
The final two terms on the right-hand side of equation (19) relate to the matching 
externalities and, following Weyl (2010), can be interpreted as a Spence distortion.6 
The first term of the Spence distortion is consistent with  Weyl (2010) who shows that 
the diverging incentives of the private and Pigouvian platform to account for positive cross-
side externalities result in an upward distortion of prices.7 By only internalizing the cross-
side externality at the marginal and not average valuation of cross-side users, the private 
monopoly platform subsidizes this  externality less than what is socially desirable. 
Consequently, the positive cross-side externality results in too high a price and too little 
participation. However, the last term in equation (19) shows that when the platform is a 
6 This terminology refers to the contribution of Spence (1975), who first pointed out that a monopoly that decides both on price (or 
quantity) and product quality tends to serve the quality preferences of marginal consumers instead of average consumers as would be 
optimal from a social point of view. Weyl (2010) revisits this argument for multi-sided platforms, by interpreting the amount of users on 
one side as a measure of quality of the platform service for users on the other side. 
7 This result unambiguously holds when there is only one source of user heterogeneity in transaction valuations – or net match valuations 
in our setting – which implies 𝑣𝐼� > 𝑣𝐼�  is always positive. More generally, it is possible to have a negative Spence distortion also when 
there are only positive cross-side externalities. For example, Rochet and Tirole (2006) allow for multidimensional heterogeneity in user 
types and equilibrium in their model could result in a negative Spence distortion. As argued by Weyl (2010) this will be the case if the 
spread between the average transaction valuation of marginal and infra-marginal users is negative, which will depend on the dominating 
source of heterogeneity in user types. 
14 
 
                                                          
 
 
matchmaker, there also is a negative own-side externality that leads to a negative term in 
the Spence distortion. The reason for this is that the monopoly matchmaker taxes the 
negative own-side externality at the marginal less than average valuation of own-side users. 
This leads to a price that is less than what is socially desirable and too much participation.  
Note that even though there is only one source of user heterogeneity in our setting, the 
Spence distortion can be downward if the negative own-side effect dominates the positive 
cross-side effect – a result that cannot be obtained from standard platform models where 
own-side congestion plays no role. On any side this is more likely to be the case if the 
matching elasticity is smaller, i.e. when the platform is a less efficient matchmaker on that 
side of the market. In the next two subsections we explore the relationship between the 
platform’s matching technology and market distortions on both sides of the market in 
greater detail. 
4.3 Asymmetries in Spence distortions between sides of the platform 
An interesting question is how the Spence distortion relates between sides of the 
platform and how this relationship depends on the platform’s matching technology. This is 
what we examine in this subsection. We show that when the matching function exhibits 
decreasing (increasing) returns to scale, the Spence distortion must be negative (positive) 
on at least one side of the market.  
To see this, define 𝑠𝐼� ≡ 𝑣𝐼� − 𝑝𝐼 = 𝑣𝐼� − 𝑣𝐼� as the average per-match surplus of users on 
side 𝐼 = 𝐴,𝐵 of the market and note that (19) can be written as (with 𝐽 ≠ 𝐼): 
𝑀𝐷𝐼 = 𝜇𝐼 + 𝑠𝐽�𝜙𝐼 − 𝑠𝐼�𝜙𝐽 − 𝑠𝐼� (1 − 𝜙𝐼 − 𝜙𝐽)                                     (20) 
For example, assume that the matching function has constant returns to scale, i.e. 𝜙𝐴 +
𝜙𝐵 = 1. If this is the case, the sign of the Spence distortion on side 𝐴 coincides with the 
sign of 𝑠𝐵���𝜙𝐴 − 𝑠𝐴���𝜙𝐵 and on side 𝐵 with 𝑠𝐴���𝜙𝐵 − 𝑠𝐵���𝜙𝐴. Consequently, when the Spence 
distortion is positive on one side, it must be negative on the other side. Equation (20) also 
provides a more general relationship between Spence distortions on both sides of the 
market and the platform’s matching technology: 
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Corollary 2. When the matching function has weakly decreasing returns to scale (𝜙𝐴 +
𝜙𝐵 ≤ 1), the Spence distortion is weakly negative on at least one side of the market. When 
the matching function has increasing returns to scale (𝜙𝐴 + 𝜙𝐵 > 1), the Spence 
distortion is positive on at least one side of the market. 
Finally note that Corollary 2 and equation (20) do not exclude the possibility that the 
market distortion as a whole is negative. For example, assume that the negative own-side 
externality on side B of the market is large such that  𝜙𝐵 is small and 𝜙𝐴 + 𝜙𝐵 ≤ 1. From 
Corollary 2 we then know that the Spence distortion must be negative on at least one side 
of the market. Say this is the high-price side B of the market. If on this side the negative 
Spence distortion is larger in absolute value than the classic distortion resulting from 
market power, equation (19) shows that the market distortion as a whole will be negative. 
What this means is that the private monopolist charges the high-price side B too low a 
price. Moreover, the Spence distortion on the low-price side A of the market will be too 
high, such that the inequality in market prices between both sides of the market is too low 
from a social point of view. The next subsection shows this is the case when heterogeneity 
is lognormally distributed assuming realistic parameter values and when there is a constant 
returns to scale matching function. 
4.4 An application: lognormal heterogeneity and constant returns to scale 
matching 
The previous subsection derived a relationship between the platform’s matching 
technology and market distortions in a very general way. For example, it didn’t determine 
on which side of the market the Spence distortion will be negative when the matching 
function has decreasing or constant returns to scale. And for the side that has the negative 
Spence distortion, whether the market distortion as a whole is also negative. To answer 
these type of questions we need to be more specific about the underlying heterogeneity of 
user types and returns to scale in the matching function. This is what we do in this 
subsection.  
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Assume lognormally distributed net match valuations, 𝐹(. ), for both workers and 
firms. This could be the case if labor productivity and therefore the wage is lognormally 
distributed, and firms value productivity and workers value wages. More specifically,  
assume that net match valuations are lognormally distributed on both sides with mean 10.4 
and standard deviation 0.85. We borrow these parameter values from Fabinger and Weyl 
(2012), who obtain these values by calibrating the lognormal distribution to the 2011 US 
yearly income distribution. Also assume a constant elasticity matching function 
homogeneous of degree 1 such that 𝜙𝐴 + 𝜙𝐵 = 1.   
From Corollary 1 we know that if 𝜙𝐵 > 𝜙𝐴 we must also have that  𝑝𝐵 < 𝑝𝐴 when the 
inverse hazard rate of demand is decreasing in price, which can easily be shown to be the 
case in the present example. Moreover, from equation (20) it follows that the sign of the 
Spence distortion on the worker-side coincides with the sign of 𝑠𝐴���𝜙𝐵 − 𝑠𝐵���𝜙𝐴 and on the 
firm-side with 𝑠𝐵���𝜙𝐴 − 𝑠𝐴���𝜙𝐵. So if the Spence distortion is negative on one side of the 
market, it must be positive on the other. To see on which side it is positive and on which 
side it is negative, we need to solve the model and that is what we do next. 
Figure 1 illustrates the model’s optimal prices and distortions on both sides of the 
market. The horizontal axes depict the matching elasticity on the worker-side ranging from 
0.5 to 1, and hence the matching elasticity on the firm-side ranging from 0.5 to zero given 
that 𝜙𝐵 = 1 − 𝜙𝐴. In other words, Figure 1 shows what happens to equilibrium prices and 
distortions on both sides of the market when the efficiency of the matching technology 
becomes more asymmetric in favor of the worker-side of the market. 
[Figure 1] 
The top-left panel of Figure 1 shows that the optimal private price for workers goes 
down and for firms goes up when 𝜙𝐵 increases, consistent with Corollary 1. The top-right 
panel demonstrates that the classic Cournot distortion increases on the worker-side and 
decreases on the firm-side as 𝜙𝐵 increases, which is consistent with a decreasing inverse 
hazard rate. The bottom-left panel of Figure 1 shows that the Spence distortion is always 
positive for workers – i.e. the low-price side of the market, and always negative for firms – 
i.e. the high-price side of the market. 
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The market distortion as a whole on each side of the market is the sum of the Cournot 
and Spence distortions, given in the top-right and bottom-left panels of Figure 1 
respectively. The total market distortion also is the difference between the private and 
Pigouvian prices, given in the bottom-right panel of Figure 1 for workers and for firms. 
Note that in this example the Pigouvian platform always subsidizes the more efficient 
worker-side of the market and recovers this subsidy from the firm-side, consistent with 
Proposition 2 for a constant returns to scale matching function. 
The bottom-right panel further implies that the total market distortion on the worker-
side is unambiguously upward, even though the worker side is the low-priced side of the 
market. The private price for firms is smaller than their Pigouvian price for minimal 
asymmetry in the matching technology. In other words, despite that the firm-side is the 
high priced side of the market, the private price is still too low compared to what is socially 
optimal. Together with the positive total market distortion on the worker-side of the 
platform, this implies that the inequality in prices between sides of the platform is too low 
from a social point of view. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have shown how a private monopoly matchmaker internalizes the 
matching externalities – a negative own-side congestion and positive cross-side externality 
– that are inherent to its matching technology. If the matching technology is more efficient 
(i.e. the negative own-side externality is small and the positive cross-side externality is 
large) on a side of the market, the monopoly matchmaker will charge that side a lower price 
for its service. Comparing prices between sides of the platform, we have also shown that a 
monopoly matchmaker will charge a lower price to the side that matches its users more 
efficiently. For example, many online listing platforms, such as Monster.com or 
Forsalebyowner.com, charge sellers that list prices for their goods on the platform a larger 
fee than buyers to search among the listed goods, and our model explains why this is the 
case: a monopoly matchmaker that uses a listing technology can more efficiently match 
buyers than sellers.  
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Our model also predicts that a monopoly matchmaker will only partially internalize the 
platform’s matching externalities. In particular, the Spence distortion on a side of the 
market is increasing in the platform’s matching efficiency for that side of the market. 
Comparing distortions between sides of the platform, we have also shown that the Spence 
distortion must be negative (positive) on at least one side of the market if the matching 
function exhibits decreasing or constant (increasing) returns to scale. For example, 
assuming that buyers are matched more efficiently in a constant returns to scale matching 
technology and that heterogeneity in user type is lognormally distributed using realistic 
parameter values, we have shown that prices are too high for buyers and too low for sellers 
for minimal asymmetries in matching elasticities between sides of the market. That is, 
inequality in market prices between sides of the online listing platform is too low from a 
social point of view. 
The economics profession is far from a full understanding of user heterogeneity and 
sorting, price formation and distortions in markets that increasingly rely on technology to 
generate trade through matchmaking platforms. This paper may serve to put a few puzzle 
pieces into their rightful locations. If so, this will mark progress towards a worthy goal. 
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Appendix A: Participation fees, per-match fees and platform costs 
All results in the main text are expressed in terms of fixed “per-match” fees denoted by 𝑝𝐼 for 
side 𝐼 = 𝐴,𝐵. However, all results can instead be expressed in terms of fixed “participation fees” 
denoted by 𝑃𝐼, which is levied when users enter the platform, by simply substituting for 𝑝𝐼 =
𝑃𝐼/(𝑀/𝑁𝐼) in all expressions.  
From the point of view of users, the indifference between paying a fixed per-match fee or a 
fixed participation fee directly follows from the assumptions of risk-neutrality, that matching is 
random (i.e. match probabilities are the same for users on a particular side) and that there are no 
transfers between matched users. To illustrate this, note that expected net utility of users when 
the platform can charge both types of fees is given by: 
𝑢𝐼 = (𝑣𝐼 − 𝑝𝐼)𝑚𝐼 − 𝑃𝐼                                                         (𝐴1) 
Users participate when 𝑣𝐼 ≥ 𝑣𝐼� ≡ 𝑃𝐼/𝑚𝐼 + 𝑝𝐼 and demand is given by 𝑁𝐼 = 𝑛𝐼 �1 − 𝐹𝐼�𝑣𝐼���. 
So, the platform can reach any desired allocation (𝑁𝐴,𝑁𝐵) whether one or both pricing 
instruments are available and is therefore indifferent between both.  
That the platform is indifferent between fixed per-match and fixed participation fees only 
holds when platform costs are independent of the type of fee charged. To see this, assume that 
the platform incurs a per-match cost 𝑐 proportional to the amount of matches that occur through 
the platform and a side-specific cost 𝐶𝐼 to attract users on each side. When both fees are 
available to the platform, profits can be written as: 
𝜋 = (𝑝𝐴 + 𝑝𝐵 − 𝑐)𝑀(𝑁𝐴,𝑁𝐵) + (𝑃𝐴 − 𝐶𝐴)𝑁𝐴 + (𝑃𝐵 − 𝐶𝐵)𝑁𝐵        (A2) 
When 𝑐, 𝐶𝐴 and 𝐶𝐵 are constants, the platform can maximize profits by choosing the optimal 
allocation 𝑁𝐴,𝑁𝐵 and by setting both types of fees such that the right amount of users on each 
side are attracted. Note that any allocation can be reached by setting 𝑝𝐴 = 𝑝𝐵 = 0 and adjusting 
the participation fee or by setting 𝑃𝐴 = 𝑃𝐵 = 0 and adjusting the per-match fee. But when 𝑐, 𝐶𝐴 
and 𝐶𝐵 are not constant and depend on the value of the fees charged, the equivalence between 
the two fee types no longer holds. For example, if 𝑐 = 0 when 𝑝𝐴 = 𝑝𝐵 = 0 and 𝑐 > 0 when 𝑝𝐴 
or 𝑝𝐵 > 0 and 𝐶𝐴 and 𝐶𝐵 constant, then the platform always prefers participation over flat fees. 
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This scenario is particularly relevant when it is costly for matchmakers to observe individual 
matches in order to charge fixed per-match fees.8 
Finally, note that the discussion so far assumed that the availability of a single pricing 
instrument on each side of the market suffices for the platform to reach its desired allocation. 
However, the presence of network externalities typically implies that the platform faces a 
problem of equilibrium multiplicity. As suggested by Caillaud and Jullien (2001), the availability 
of multiple pricing instruments on each side of the market can help the platform to reach its 
preferred equilibrium. This issue is further addressed in Appendix B. 
8 When the platform observes matches, it can typically do better than charging fixed per-match fees. When (part of) the match surplus is 
observed, the platform can price discriminate between users. For example, real estate brokers observe the selling price of a transaction or 
temporary help agencies observe the wage of the workers they assign to firms. These platforms typically price discriminate users by charging a 
commission fee proportional to the observed component of the match surplus. In our model, fixed per-match fees and proportional fees are not 
equivalent.  
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Appendix B: Equilibrium existence and uniqueness 
It is well-known from the platform literature that if a platform chooses optimal prices in the 
first stage and users of the two sides simultaneously decide on participation in the second stage, 
there is an inherent problem of equilibrium multiplicity due to user coordination failures. 
Borrowing the terminology in Caillaud and Jullien (2001), a “bad-expectation” market allocation 
can always prevail in which case none of the users of either side participate, whatever prices 
charged by the platform. This because they have negative beliefs about the participation decision 
of users on the other side. So, the question is when the “good-expectation” market allocation will 
prevail that was described in the main text of the paper. 
One way to address the issue is to assume a “rational-expectations” equilibrium as suggested 
by Caillaud and Jullien (2003). The intuition is that users on both sides have “favorable” beliefs 
about the participation decision of other users. When there exists an equilibrium that for users of 
both sides is favorable compared to, for example, the nonparticipation equilibrium, users will 
decide to participate. In our setting, when users on side 𝐴 have favorable beliefs about the 
participation decision of 𝐵-side users, they participate when their net match valuation is greater 
than or equal to the per-match fee charged by the platform. So, demand on side 𝐴 is equal to 
𝑁𝐴 = 𝑛𝐴(1 − 𝐹𝐴(𝑝𝐴)). Similarly, under favorable beliefs demand on side 𝐵 is equal to 
𝑁𝐵 = 𝑛𝐵(1 − 𝐹𝐵(𝑝𝐵)) and there exists a unique set of prices that corresponds to the 
monopolist’s profit maximizing allocation. Moreover, as suggested by Caillaud and Jullien 
(2001), the assumption of favorable beliefs is unnecessary if the platform can use multiple 
pricing instruments. For example, when the platform can charge per-match as well as 
participation fees on each side of the market, it can grant a small participation subsidy arbitrarily 
close to zero such that all users on both sides are willing to participate. The platform can then 
adjust its per-match fees to establish its profit maximizing allocation. This would also be 
possible in our model since we have that fixed per-match and participation fees are isomorphic 
as was discussed in Appendix A,  
In case the platform charges participation fees conditional on the amount of users or 
“insulating tariffs”, Weyl (2010) shows how a unique equilibrium can exist. The intuition is that 
the platform can select any chosen amount of participants on a particular side by charging them a 
price conditional on the amount of users entering on the other side of the market. For this to be 
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possible, there must be a unique price on a side of the market which can be written as a function 
of participation on both sides. In our model, inverse demand in terms of a fixed participation fee 
on side 𝐼 of a market can be written as: 
𝑃𝐼(𝑁𝐼 ,𝑁𝐽) = 𝐹𝐼−1 �1 − 𝑁𝐼
𝑛𝐼
�
𝑀(𝑁𝐼 ,𝑁𝐽)
𝑁𝐼
                                         (𝐵1) 
Now, note that for any given amount of 𝐽-side participants, say 𝑁𝐽� , there is a unique price that 
pins down or insulates the level of 𝐼-side participation desired by the platform, say 𝑁𝐼�, and 
𝑃𝐼�𝑁𝐼� ,𝑁𝐽�� is the unique insulating tariff. Once the participation rate on side 𝐼 is fixed there is no 
longer a coordination problem on side 𝐽 and the platform can attract any desired amount of users. 
In other words, the platform can implement any desired allocation 𝑁𝐴� ,𝑁𝐵�  by charging an 
insulating tariff on at least one side of the market. 
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Figure 1: Optimal Prices and Distortions on Both Sides of the Market 
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